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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Special and Diﬀerential Treatment (SDT) represents an important and con-
troversial tool of the WTO’s approach to development. Developing countries
regard SDT as an instrument for expanding their export capacities and for tak-
ing part in the multilateral trading system, avoiding costs not compatible with
their development needs.
An important dimension of SDT is represented by unilateral trade preference
schemes. Developed countries oﬀer these preferences to developing countries in
order to ensure a better access to their market without asking in exchange
a reciprocal treatment. The aim of these preferences is to help developing
economies to expand their production capacity by oﬀering them bigger potential
markets for their products.
The traditional unilateral trade preference program is the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preference (GSP), which was introduced in the ‘70s. In subsequent years,
several additional schemes have been added. These schemes are granted to dif-
ferent groups of countries, cover diﬀerent products and oﬀer diﬀerent types of
access. The European Union, for instance, oﬀers not only the GSP, but also
the GSP regime for Least Developed Countries; the regime to combat drug pro-
d u c t i o n ;a n d ,t h eL o m èr e g i m ef o rt h eA f r i c a nC a r i b b e a na n dP a c i ﬁcC o u n t r i e s
(ACP). The latter is soon to be replaced by the bilateral trade agreements as
foreseen by the Cotonou Convention.
The impact of these unilateral trade preferences has been the subject of
numerous studies but mixed results have lead authors either to criticize the ef-
fectiveness of these programs or to even raise the possibility of negative eﬀects.
Even in cases where schemes oﬀer preferences for a wide range of products,
rules of origin (ROO) and administrative requirements seem to have prevented
exporters from asking preferential access (Brenton 2003, Inama 2004). More-
over, the absence of stability in the unilateral preference schemes, which are not
binding but are subject to frequent revisions, appears to have discouraged long
term investments (Kennan, Stevens 2000).
Furthermore, preferences are seen as potentially harmful as they can either
create an incentive to specialize in the product under preferential access or they
can prevent the beneﬁciary countries from adopting more liberal trade policies.
As pointed out by Mold (2005), criticism of unilateral trade preferences are
based on the argument that "preferences might actually reduce the incentives
to diversify: by increasing the potential rents from traditional exports, (...)
preferences could contribute to ’locking in’ developing countries even more de-
cisively into existing productive structures". If this is the case, then preference
erosion due to general tariﬀ cuts could exacerbate the situation by leading to
trade diversion as competition from other developing countries increases.
2The existing literature has focused mostly on the calculation of indicators
such as utility and utilization ratio; and on gravity equation in order to estimate
the impact of unilateral trade preferences on the volume of trade. Additionally,
simulations have analyzed the eﬀect of trade diversion/creation. Results are
rather inconclusive and do not oﬀer a clear picture. As pointed out by Hoeck-
man and Ozden (2005) “most studies have severe shortcomings as they fail to
take into account that (a) preference rules are often determined at the very dis-
aggregated product level, (b) the elasticity estimates at this level of aggregation
are generally absent, and (c) ﬁnding the right controls to include in regressions
are diﬃcult.” (Hoeckam et all., 2005, p.13).
This paper adds to the literature by trying to assess empirically the eﬀect
of the European unilateral trade preferences not only on the intensive margin
but also on the extensive margin of trade. In doing so we exploit the prediction
of the Melitz (2002) model and the estimation technique employed in diﬀerent
empirical investigations of the intensive and extensive margin of trade (Amurgo-
Pachego 2006, Baldwin, Di Nino 2005). In particular, we try to answer to two
questions. The ﬁrst is the classical question regarding the impact of unilateral
trade preference on the volume of trade. Our contribution in this ﬁeld is more
technical in nature as we analyze this aspect by exploiting a detailed database
at the six digit level of the Harmonized System Classiﬁcation and using the ap-
propriate estimation technique. Our second question, the impact of European
unilateral trade preference on the extensive margin of trade, represents the real
innovation of this paper. By extensive margin of trade, we mean the appear-
ance and disappearance of exported products. This paper investigates whether
unilateral trade preferences have increased the range of exported products from
the beneﬁciary countries to the EU. We exploit the changes, in the products
covered by these schemes and the switches from zeros to positive trade ﬂows,
over the years and across countries, to carry out the analysis. By answering this
question we seek to identify whether unilateral trade preferences help a country
in the diversiﬁcation process or rather lead a country to be locked into existing
structures. Our results suggest that anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀects are present in
the case of ACP preferences while a low but positive eﬀect is found in the case
of the traditional GSP scheme. These results hold irrespective of whether we
consider that a country is part of diﬀerent regimes or whether we consider the
best regime available to a country. In the case of preference for least developing
countries results vary instead according to how preferences for a country are
deﬁned. In particular, when we consider only the best regime available to a
country, preferences for LDC not covered by the ACP preferences seem to not
have impacted on the exports from these countries. Finally, we ﬁnd positive
eﬀects on both the extensive and intensive margin of trade in the case of agri-
cultural products. This suggests the potential role of the preferences in the case
of more protected sectors but also the possibility of a concentration of resources
in this sector in the case of long standing preferences.
The paper is divided in four sections. In section two we revise the literature
3more closely related to our investigation and we discuss the main features of the
European unilateral preference schemes, which constitute the unilateral trade
regimes under investigation. In section three we present the main features and
predictions of the Melitz model which form the basis of our empirical investiga-
tion and we discuss the estimation technique employed in the empirical analysis.
In section four we present and discuss our results while section ﬁve concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w
Earlier research that is closely related to our analysis has focused on two types
of investigations: the type of market access oﬀered by the diﬀerent unilateral
trade programs, and impact of these schemes on the volume of trade.1
The type of market access granted by unilateral trade preferences is usually
proxied with calculations of product coverage, utility ratio and utilization ra-
tio. Utility ratios are calculated as the value of imports receiving preferences
divided by total dutiable imports while utilization ratios are calculated as the
value of imports receiving preferences divided by the value of the imports eli-
gible for the preferences. For instance, the European Union’s Everything but
Arms (EBA) initiative provides high product coverage, reﬂecting thus that the
European Union oﬀers LDC preferential access in a wide range of products.
On the other hand, Brenton (2003) using data for 2001, shows that the utiliza-
tion rate is rather low, suggesting that the presence of non tariﬀ barriers, strict
rules of origin and administrative costs have prevented exporters from asking
preferential access.
Candau and Jean (2006) show that when utilization rates are calculated
on the best regime available to an exporter, utilization rates are not as low as
commonly perceived. In particular, they show that utilization is high for Sub-
Saharan Africa, due to the Cotonou scheme, and high in general in the case of
agricultural products. Underutilization can instead be found only in the case
of non-African LDCs in textile and clothing, and for non-LDCs only eligible for
GSP for the textile-, the clothing- and manufacturing sector.
Additionally, they show that the extent of utilization can be linked to the
preference margin available. The higher is the preference margin, the higher is
the utilization rate.
Manchin (2006), using a threshold technique and a Heckman sample selec-
tion model, estimates whether there is a threshold in the duty oﬀered by the
Lomè agreement under which non LDC ACP countries have no incentives to ask
preferences. The investigation covers the year 2001 and data are disaggregated
at the eight digit level. Her results indicate that preferential access is asked if the
diﬀerence between the oﬀered duty and the MFN tariﬀ is around 4%. According
1An excellent overview of diﬀerent results based on gravity regressions is oﬀered by Hoek-
man and Özden (2005).
4to Manchin the presence of a threshold would thus be a quantitative measure for
the cost of requesting preferential access. Using the results from the threshold
technique she thus estimates what determines the probability that preferential
access is requested. Her results show that the probability of requesting access
is linked to the sector, in particular the probability that ACP no LDCs request
access is higher for the agricultural, textile and clothing sector while is lower for
machinery and minerals.
Another branch of research has focused on the impact of unilateral trade
preferences on the volume of export. Research is carried out using a gravity
regression and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the import country
grants unilateral trade preference to the exporting country in the period taken
into consideration. Results based on these estimations do not oﬀer a clear-cut
picture. Rose (2004), using a gravity model of total trade, ﬁnds that having the
GSP is associated with an approximate doubling of trade.
Lederman and Özden (2004) analyze the impact of USA´s unilateral pref-
erences. Their analysis is based on the value of USA imports from developing
countries at the two digit harmonized system (HS) in 1997 and 2002. They thus
implement a cross-section Tobit analysis on the two years separately and ﬁnd
that GSP has a negative eﬀect and being part of a Free Trade Area (FTA) has
a positive impact. Regarding other unilateral preference programs, the results
depend on how the schemes are proxied in the estimation.
Concerning the European unilateral preference programs, Nilsson (2002) es-
timates separate cross-section gravity equations for the period 1973-1992 and
he ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of the European GSP scheme and the ACP preference
on the value of European countries’ imports. Interestingly, the positive impact
is present at the beginning and at the end of the sample period.
Looking at the set of Lome preferences, the European Union was disap-
pointed by these preferences. The Green Paper on relations between the Euro-
pean Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century looking at the
impact of the trade preference granted under Lomè states that "as regards im-
pact, in general the Lomé trade preferences have not been suﬃcient to enhance
export growth and increase diversiﬁcation.(...) Neitherhavetheymanagedto
diversify exports signiﬁcantly and most still rely on a few primary products"2
In contrast from the previous approaches, we will look at the impact of
unilateral trade preferences not only on the intensive margin of trade, that is on
the volume of trade, but also in the quasi-extensive margin of trade, that is on
the range of the varieties exported. In doing so, our analysis will be based on
recent developments in trade theory (Melitz 2002) and econometric estimation
of the gravity equation (Baldwin and Di Nino 2005, Amurgo Pachego 2006).
Using these new developments and a detailed database at the six digit level
of the Harmonized System Classiﬁcation, we analyze the impact of the unilateral
trade preferences granted by the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus,
the question that we try to answer is not only whether the preferential access
2European Commission, Directorate General VIII/1 "Green paper on relations between
the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century-Challenges and
options for a new partnership", 1996
5granted by these schemes has increase the volume of exports of the developing
countries to the EEC but also whether the preferential access has led developing
countries to increase the range of their traded products. Answering this question
implies looking at the eﬀect of preferential access on the diversiﬁcation of exports
and thus the increase in productive capacities which is the ultimate goal of this
trade policy.
The European preference schemes
We consider in particular four unilateral preference programs: the tradi-
tional GSP, the GSP for Least Developing Countries, the regime to combat
drug production and the Lomè IV trade scheme.
During the period 1990-2004, the ﬁrst three schemes were subject to three
major revisions. Until 1999 we have two sets of council regulations that regulate
agricultural products and industrial/textile products separately. The ﬁrst revi-
sion of the full schemes took place in 1995 for textile and industrial products,
when all quantitative limitations were abolished leading to the establishment
of tariﬀ modulation for all the products covered, in 1997 for the agricultural
products, in 1999 and in 2002 for all the products that are part of the unilateral
system of preferences.3
Every council regulation brings country/sector graduation; and changes in
the products and in the numbers of countries covered. Except for the coun-
try/sector graduation the same applies also to the regime to combat drug pro-
duction and to the GSP designated to LDCs. Concerning this last set of prefer-
ences, two main additional changes are worth mentioning: in 1998 preferences
equivalent to the ACP countries were also granted to least developing countries
while in 2001 the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative began.
All three regimes involve that the EU grants unilateral trade preferences to
developing countries, which are notiﬁed to the WTO under the enabling clause.
However, diﬀerences emerge along four dimensions: product covered, access
granted, ROO and contractual versus pure concessionary nature of the beneﬁt.
T h el i t e r a t u r et h a tf o c u s e so nt h ed i ﬀerence among these schemes recognizes,
among others, three factors which help a regime in succeeding: the type of
market access granted (duty free access rather than tariﬀ reduction), the ROO
applied (diagonal cumulation rather than product fully obtained), and the
nature of the preference (stability rather than instability).
The following table shows how these factors apply to the four regimes being
considered:
Table 1 GSP GSP for LDC Reg. comb.drug ACP
duty free access X X X
diagonal cumulation X X
stability of access Xw i t hE B A X
3For 1994 the preferences are designed using Council Regulation 3833/90, which concerns
Agricultural product, 3832/90, which concern textile products, 3831/90, which concerns In-
dustrial Products and the set of Council Regulations which lead to subsequent modiﬁcations.
6The traditional GSP is usually considered the least favorable scheme. The
scheme involves a tariﬀ modulation mechanism according to product sensitivity.
From 1995 products covered by the scheme can be classiﬁed as sensitive or non
sensitive products. In terms of rules of origin requirements, for a product to be
considered eligible, it must be either wholly obtained in the country that asks
preference or it must have undergone suﬃcient working processes.
The GSP for the least developed countries diﬀer from the traditional GSP
in terms of products covered and access granted, i.e. products covered enjoy
duty free access, but rules of origin are the same as applied to the traditional
GSP framework.
The 1998 reform which granted least developed countries the same access
enjoyed by ACP countries and the subsequent EBA initiative, have expanded
the range of products which can enter duty free. In particular the EBA initiative
as the name states has granted duty free access for all products except chapter
93 "Arms and ammunition". The exception are rice and sugar, which will only
enjoy duty free access from the end of 2009, but meanwhile are still subject to
tariﬀs, albeit reduced since july 2006. Graduation rules do not apply to these
countries. Additionally, the EBA initiative has the characteristic of being a
permanent scheme, not subject to periodic revisions.
The regime to combat drug production includes a great part of the products
covered by the GSP but the market access granted is more favorable than tra-
ditional GSP since products covered enter duty free and regional cumulation is
possible.
The Lomè Agreement is often cited as the most favorable regime in terms of
access, products covered and rules of origin (diagonal cumulation is possible).
An important diﬀerence between the Lomè regime and the other unilateral pref-
erence schemes, with the exception of the EBA initiative, lies in the permanent
nature of the Lomè agreement versus a unilateral and temporary concession as
represented by the GSP.
3 The model and the empirical strategy
Since we want to investigate the impact of the European unilateral trade pref-
erence programs not only on the intensive margin of trade but also on the
extensive margin of trade we make use of the implications of the Melitz model.
We provide a short outline of the model, which rather than being exhaustive,
highlights the needed features for the empirical strategy4.
4Demidova, Looi Kee and Krishna (2005) develop a heterogeneous ﬁrm model that takes
into account the presence of Rules of Origin. The aim of their Paper is to study the eﬀects of
diﬀerent trade policies in the composition of productivities. By exploiting the diﬀerent regimes
that apply to a set of Bangladesh garmament exporter, they constructed ﬁrm level total factor
productivity to test the predictions of the model. As the objective of our investigation diﬀers,
we prefer to use a more general formulation of the Mellitz model that allows us to deal with
unilateral preference using a dummy variable.
7I nt h eM e l i t zm o d e lt h er a n g eo fﬁrms that produce and sell in the domestic
and foreign markets is endogenously determined and is related to the ﬁrm’s
marginal cost.
Assuming CES preferences, the households‘ demand for each individual








E represents the total expenditure of the typical consumer in country i, σ is
the elasticity of substitution across goods and assumed to be greater than one,










CES Price Index where summation is taken over all goods consumed in country
i.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms in each economy. In order to enter the market,
a ﬁrm from country i must pay a ﬁxed cost, which is considered sunk. The entry
decision is based on the comparison between the discounted value of the expected
stream of proﬁts and the ﬁxed entry cost. If the former is greater than the latter,
a ﬁrm pays the ﬁxed entry cost and draws a labour-per-unit-output coeﬃcient a
from a cumulative distribution function G(a). Hence, ﬁrms are heterogeneous as
they produce with diﬀe r e n tl a b o u r -p e r -u n i to u t p u tc o e ﬃcient a. Productivity
diﬀerences across ﬁrms translate into diﬀerences in the unit cost of production.
Upon observing the draw, a ﬁrm may decide to exit and not to produce. If the
ﬁrm produces, it faces a constant probability δ in every period of encountering
a bad shock that forces it to exit. Also, if the ﬁrm chooses to produce, it
bears additional ﬁxed costs Fo,w h e r e o stands for origin. There are no other
ﬁxed costs when the ﬁrm sells only in the home country. If the ﬁrm chooses
additionally to export to the foreign market, it bears also a ﬁxed cost Fd
x and a
melting-iceberg trade cost τod, where the subscript x denotes export costs and
the superscript d denotes the destination market. Proﬁt maximization from
domestic and export sales lead ﬁrms to set prices as a markup over marginal












Using this information and the derivation of the CES demand, operating

























8According to this model, a ﬁrm decides whether to enter and how much to
sell in a market, comprised its own market, if its marginal cost is low enough to
ensure non negative proﬁts.
Firstly, a ﬁrm will sell in its own market only if its marginal cost is low
enough to ensure at least zero proﬁt. In the contrary case, a ﬁrm will exit the
market. Setting (1) equals to zero and re-arranging terms, the cut-oﬀ condition







where ¯ aoo is the threshold marginal cost for local sales in nation o, Bo is
the demand shifter in nation o and equals Eo/P1−σ
o , that is total expenditure
of nation o on all varieties divided by the CES price index.
Not all the ﬁrms that produce for the domestic market are able to sell also
in the foreign market.
Among all the domestic ﬁrms only the most productive will export. Setting









where ¯ aod rapresents the threshold for exporting to market d and Bd is the
demand shifter of nation d.
Firms divide themselves into three categories according to their marginal
cost. Firms that have a marginal cost higher than ¯ aoo do not produce and
exit the market, ﬁrms with marginal cost between ¯ aoo and ¯ aod serve only the
domestic market while ﬁrms that have a marginal cost lower or equal to ¯ aod also
export to the foreign market.
Based on these conditions, we can see that the decision of the ﬁrms to
export to the foreign market is associated with the presence/absence of trade
ﬂow between nation-o and nation-d.
Thus, there is a one to one relationship between the decision of the ﬁrms to
export to the nation-d market and the presence of trade ﬂow between nation-o
and nation-d.










Bd,a ≤ ¯ aod
0,a > ¯ aod
(5)
And thus summing over all export sales, the total imports of nation d from















¢σ−1 ,a ≤ ¯ aod
0,a > ¯ aod
(6)
Where the cumulative distribution function G is cut at ¯ aoo since ﬁrms export
conditional on being able to produce.
The model provides thus an explanation for the change of trade along the
extensive margin, which represents the number of products exported, and the
intensive margin, which represents the volume of trade. Changes in the export
cut-oﬀ condition for a product leads to changes along the extensive margin while
changes on the average value of export sales lead to changes along the intensive
margin.
Unilateral preferences could reduce the variable cost τod through the grant-
ing of a lower duty. Alternatively, the cost associated with the request of prefer-
ential access, such as administrative costs, ROO and non tariﬀ barriers produce
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect. These costs increase the variable trade cost and the ﬁxed
cost to export. Thus a ﬁrm takes advantage of the preferential access only under
the condition that the positive eﬀect prevails.
The eﬀect of a reduction in τod impacts along the two dimensions: new ﬁrms,
which previously could not export due to the higher variable cost, start to sell
also in the foreign market and previous exporters increase the amount of sales.
Changes in the ﬁxed cost, Fx
d , impacts instead only on the extensive margin of
trade but not on the amount of sales of ﬁrms that remain exporters5.
Table 2 τod Fx
d
probability of exporting a variety X X
volume of trade XX X
Although these impacts take place at the ﬁrm level, aggregation of volume
of trade for each ﬁrm-variety at the product level, as shown by (6), allows us to
formulate testable predictions for the extensive margin of trade. (6) shows that
the value of export is linked to the presence of ﬁrms that are able, due to their
marginal cost, to sell in a foreign market. As a consequence, we could see zero
trade ﬂow if ﬁrms from nation o do not ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et oe x p o r tt on a t i o nd.
It follows that according to the model, the presence of zeros tells us that ﬁrms
do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable either to produce or to export a particular product to
the foreign market.
Potential negative eﬀects due to preference erosion arise in this model either
when previously exported products disappear or when trade volume decreases.
The eﬀect of a reduction in the tariﬀ rate to third countries or general tariﬀ cuts
5Note that if non tariﬀ barriers, ROO and administrative requirements associated with
unilateral trade preferences prevent ﬁrms from asking access under unilateral preference pro-
grams, none of these eﬀects would take place.
10could lead to an increase in the number of exported ﬁrms from those countries.
Competition from third countries could potentially drive out former exporting
ﬁrms from the country that previously beneﬁted from a lower duty, if the ability
of a ﬁrm to export is entirely due to the preference margin available before the
tariﬀ cut.
Having summarized the potential eﬀects of unilateral trade preferences, we
deﬁne the estimation strategy. We use (6) and exploit the predictions of the
model in order to investigate the eﬀect of unilateral trade preferences on the
appearence and disappearence of exported products (extensive margin) and on
the volume of trade of existing exporters (intensive margin). Our strategy is to
use the imports of ten European countries at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System and to exploit the disaggregated data in order to analyze the relationship
between the switching of the zeros into positive trade ﬂows and modiﬁcation in
the products covered by the European unilateral preference schemes. Unilateral
trade preferences are captured by dummies that take the value of one if the
product of a country enjoys preferential access.
Following Baldwin and Di Nino (2005) and Amurgo Pachego (2006), we









d ,a ≤ aod
where
Πod[a]=m a x( 0 ,Π∗
od[a]) →
½
Πod[a] ≥ 0, Π∗
od[a] ≥ 0 a ≤ ¯ aod
Πod[a]=0 , Π∗
od[a] < 0¯ aod <a≤ ¯ aoo
The uncensored proﬁt/ loss variable represents the link between the decision
of a ﬁrm to export a product and the fact that a product is exported. We do
not observe proﬁtability but we observe the appearence and disappearence of
trade ﬂow in particular tariﬀ-lines. Exploiting this one-to-one relationship we
estimate the log-linear form of (6) using a tobit technique which allows us to
identify the overall eﬀect of the covariates on the intensive and on extensive
margin of trade.
As the log of zero is undeﬁned we shift the whole distribution of trade values
by one unit.
As we are interested in the observed variation of trade volume, we cannot
give an economic interpretation to the raw coeﬃcients of the tobit estimate
(Wooldrige (2002); p. 520). We therefore present next to the raw coeﬃcients,
the marginal eﬀects that follow from the tobit estimation.
We are in particular interested in two types of marginal eﬀects. The ﬁrst is
the marginal eﬀect of the independent variable on the expected value of trade,
conditional on trade volume being uncensored. For the preference dummy vari-
ables, this constitutes the eﬀect of the discrete change (i.e. from zero to one)
of a preference dummy on the intensive margin of trade when trade value is
11already positive and thus, it would represent the ulterior increase in trade when
trade is already positive.
The second is the marginal eﬀect of the independent variable on the change
in the probability of observing a positive trade ﬂow. For the preference dummy
this represents the eﬀect of the discrete change on the probability that trade
ﬂow is positive and it can be interpreted as the eﬀect of the preference on the
extensive margin of trade.
Mathematically these are computed respectively as:
E1 (y∗ | y∗ > 0) − E0 (y∗ | y∗ > 0)
P1 (y∗ > 0) − P0 (y∗ > 0)
where E1 is the the expected value of trade under preference, E0 is the
expected value of trade in the tariﬀ lines that do not beneﬁt from the preference,
P1 is the probability that trade volume is positive when preference is granted
and P0 the corresponding probability when preference is not granted.
We also report the unconditional marginal eﬀect which represents the overall
change of the dependent variable for a one unit change in the independent
variable. For the preference dummy variable it is calculated as:
E1 (y∗) − E0 (y∗)=P0 (y∗ > 0)[E1 (y∗ | y∗ > 0) − E0 (y∗ | y∗ > 0)]
+E1 (y∗ | y∗ > 0)[P1 (y∗ > 0) − P0 (y∗ > 0)]
The total change in the unconditional expected value of trade represents
thus a weighted average of the previous two marginal eﬀects where the weights
are respectively the probability that trade volume on the tariﬀ line that does
not beneﬁt from preferential access is positive and the expected value of trade
for the tariﬀ line that enjoy preferential access (Cong, 2000). For a continuous
dependent variable, which in our case is represented by the GDP of the export-
ing country marginal eﬀects are instead related to the Mc Donald and Moﬃt
decomposition.6
As our interest is mainly in the eﬀect of unilateral trade preferences on the
change in the number of exported goods (extensive margin), we also perform
a probit estimation. Probit estimation allows us to directly test the eﬀect of
unilateral trade preferences on the extensive margin of trade. This eﬀect is
given by the change in the probability of having a positive trade ﬂow due to an
inﬁnitesimal change in the independent variable, when the variable is continuous
(i.e.GDP) and to a discrete change, in the case of a dummy variable.7
6See Wooldrige (2002) for a detailed presentation.
7We choose Probit rather than Logit for two main reasons. Firstly, as Wooldrige (2002)
points out, a comparison in the sign of the raw coeﬃcients of Probit and Tobit estimates
constitute a rough idea of the appropriateness of the Tobit estimation, and second as a matter
of convenience due to the large database.
123.1 The Data
The one-to-one relationship between range of exported goods and presence/absence
of trade ﬂows becomes evident when we use highly disaggregated data. There-
fore, our strategy is to exploit disaggregated import data of a set of European
countries from 118 developing countries.8
In this manner, we can analyze the relationship between the switching of the
zeros into positive trade ﬂows and modiﬁcation in the products covered by the
European unilateral preference schemes.
Trade data comes from the Comtrade databases which provides imports of
ten European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
UK, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) at the six digit level of the Harmonized
system 1988/1992 for the time period 1994-2005. The choice of countries and
time is due to availability of disaggregated data.9 However, we do not ﬁnd this
constraint too limitative. The time span 1994-2005 is an interesting period for
the European unilateral preference schemes: the schemes, with the exception of
the Lome´/Cotonou were revised four times. These revisions have led to changes
in the products covered and, following the 1995 investigation, to graduation of
a large amount of sector for the most competitive beneﬁciary countries.
To exploit all these changes, we have deﬁned unilateral trade preferences with
dummy variables that take the value of one when the exports at the six-digit level
from a particular country enjoys preferential access. For the GSP framework
we built the database following the set of council regulations implemented in
the period under analysis and the Wits Trains database while for the ACP
preferences we have made used of the Trains database.
In order to control for eﬀects derived from other trade regimes, we also in-
clude a FTA dummy that takes the value of one when a bilateral trade agreement
between the EU and an exporting country is in force and a WTO dummy that
takes the value of one when the exporting country is part of the WTO. As for
the FTA dummy we consider the agreements in force during the period taken
into consideration. These include the EU-Chile Association Agreement, the
EU-Mexico FTA Agreement, the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement and the bilateral Euro-med Association Agreements with
Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt.10 Regarding the other variables, since
the number of varieties is related to the endowment of the exporting (origin)
nation, we proxy for it with the GDP of the exporting nation. Data for the GDP
comes from the World Bank Development Indicator and from the IMF database.
8See Appendix B for a list of included countries.
9For the antecedent years, we could have used other classiﬁcations and then convert trade
value according to the Harmonized System. However, using this approach would create prob-
lems with the construction of precise unilateral preference dummies.
10Data on the entry into force are taken from
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreemnts.htm (of the Eu-
romed agreements) and from
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_111588.pdfdata (for the
other agreements) while data on the WTO membership comes from
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
13Since the dependent variable is the sum of the imports of European countries,
the term Ed, usually proxied with the GDP of the importing countries, will be
captured by year dummy terms.
3.2 A glance at the data
Since our analysis focuses on export diversiﬁcation patterns and its link with
the type of preferences enjoyed by a country, we divide the panel of countries
into two major groups: the ﬁrst group represents the countries that enjoy ACP
preferences while the second group consists of countries that enjoy only the GSP
preferences. In 2004, of the 118 developing countries of the Panel , 64 are ACP
beneﬁciaries while the remaining, with the exception of South Korea, Singapore
and Myanmar are beneﬁciaries of one of the sub schemes of the GSP. In the
ﬁrst graph we plot the total number of exported lines by group of countries. As
the following graph shows, beneﬁciary of the GSP programs export, compared
to the ACP group, a larger amount of products. Additionally the number of
products exported for the GSP group is increasing over time at a faster rate
than for the ACP groups.












































Graph two shows the percentage of the exported lines which are covered by
the corresponding regime. Although by doing so we are assuming full utilization
of preferences and thus we are overstating the eﬀects, two main points emerge:
ﬁrst, the products exported by the ACP group tend to be those which are
covered by the regime. This is less the case for the GSP group. Second, the
share of exported lines covered by the regime is decreasing over the last part of
the period taken into consideration. This is due to diﬀerent reasons such as the
14increase in the amount of tariﬀ lines for which preferences are redundant (i.e.
products for which the MFN is zero) while for the GSP schemes this is also due
to the increasing amount of country sector graduation among the beneﬁciaries
of the traditional scheme.
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It is also interesting to note that for ACP countries the number of exported
lines and the tariﬀ lines under ACP preferences seem closely related. In Appen-
dix A we show the number of exported lines and the number of exported lines
covered by the ACP scheme for three countries: Mauritius, which is usually
considered a country that successfully has taken advantage of these preferences,
Dominica, as a representative of the Caribbean countries, and Gambia as one
of the ACP Least Developed Countries.
The graphs tend to conﬁrm the fact that the exported lines are also covered
by the ACP schemes. Additionally, the amount of tariﬀ lines exported has
reached its maximum around 2001-2002. Afterwards the number of exported
lines starts to fall strongly in the case of Dominica and Gambia while in the
case of Mauritius the situation tends to remain unchanged.
A ﬁrst look at the data leaves thus the message that while ACP countries
have preferences for a larger part of their exported lines, the amount of exported
products either have remained stable or have decreased.
4R e s u l t s
In order to analyze the impact of the four unilateral preference schemes on the
intensive and extensive margin of trade, we analyze the changes, over the years
15for each developing country. Our strategy is to use the imports, for the period
1994-2004, of ten European countries at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System. We analyze the relationship between the switching of the zeros into
positive trade ﬂows and the change in product coverage of the diﬀerent unilateral
preference schemes. We associate the impact of unilateral trade preferences on
the extensive margin of trade with the eﬀects of the preferential schemes on the
probability of observing a positive trade ﬂow, while we associate the impact of
unilateral trade preferences on the intensive margin of trade with the eﬀects
of these preferences on the expected value of trade conditional on trade being
positive.
We ﬁrst carry out a tobit estimation using the full panel, which includes
around six and half million data points. Results are reported in Table 1. From
the tobit estimation, we see that the GSP and the regime to combat drug pro-
duction aﬀect the conditional expected value of trade positively (7% and 9%
respectively). Conversely, the ACP and the GSP preferences for Least De-
veloping Countries (LDC) decrease trade, conditional on trade being positive
(respectively by 11% and 19%). These marginal eﬀects represent the impact of
a discrete change of the unilateral trade preference dummies on the expected
value of trade when trade is positive. They represent the eﬀect on the intensive
margin of trade, thus reﬂecting the impact of preferences on the average value
of exports from beneﬁciary countries. We can see that GSP and the regime to
combat drug production have increased the average value of exports, while ACP
and GSP for LDC preferences have impacted negatively on the intensive margin
of trade.
The extensive margin of trade is represented by the eﬀect of preferences on
the probability that trade ﬂows are positive. GSP and the regime to combat
drug production impact positively, while the impact of the ACP and GSP for
LDC preferences is negative. Although, these negative marginal eﬀects on the
probability of observing a positive trade ﬂow are rather low in terms of magni-
tude, they imply an anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀect of these preferences. This supports
the hypothesis that preferences could lock countries in to existing structural ca-
pacities, rather than encourage export diversiﬁcation.
The negative impact on the intensive margin could represent the eﬀects of
the erosion in the margin of the preferences and the consequent diversion of
trade. This could be the result of product expansion, along the years, covered
by the traditional GSP and the regime to combat drug production or more
general tariﬀ cuts, beneﬁting third countries. This would imply not only that
certain type of preferences could lock countries in to existing products, but also
that preference erosion has lead to the exit of the least eﬃcient producers once
the barriers to third countries are lifted and competition arises.
Looking at table one, it is also interesting to note that ACP and GSP LDC
preferences, as represented by the EBA initiative, have in common two charac-
teristics: the duty free access and the stability of the agreement. The Melitz
model is a one sector model, but when we deal with the volume of trade for all
possible tradable products, we have intuitively an additional eﬀect. Unilateral
trade preferences could increase the number of ﬁrms and the average export
16sales at the product level, but lead to specialization. Specialization arises if
existing ﬁrms are concentrated within a particular sector. This eﬀect emerges
because potential entrants pay the ﬁxed cost to enter only if the discounted
value of their expected stream of proﬁts is high enough. Unilateral preferences
could generate higher proﬁts and thus a higher number of potential entrants for
particular sectors, rather than for all the products covered by the scheme.
We could thus hypothesize that stability has on one hand induced higher
long term investment, but on the other hand these investments are rather con-
centrated in a particular sector. This could constitute a problem if long term
investment is proﬁtable only as long as countries enjoy a higher advantage with
respect to third countries.
Latent var./  Uncond. Cond. on  Prob.
Raw coeff. exp. value be cens. uncens.
gsp  0.523***  0.036***  0.079***  0.005***
gsp_ldc -1.269*** -0.085*** -0.190*** -0.013***
drug_regime  0.618***  0.045***  0.094***  0.006***
ACP -0.752*** -0.052*** -0.113*** -0.008***
Log GDPexp  0.063  0.004  0.009  0.0006
Fta -0.07 -0.004 -0.01 -0.0007
WTO -0.037 -0.002 -0.005 -0.0004
Table 3    
Tobit estimates
Marg. Effects
Pseudo R_squared: 0.1449                                
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
  Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
  Number of observations 6515756
Although, these results could be seen as supportive of a harmful eﬀect of
certain unilateral trade preferences, we cannot oﬀer a deﬁnitive judgment with-
out further investigation. It seems reasonable to think that ACP preferences
could have encouraged specialization since the stability of preferences is present
along the whole period under analysis, while GSP for LDC has oﬀered a high
coverage of products with duty free entrance only since 2001. Additionally, costs
associated with asking for preferential access are rather high in the case of GSP
preferences compared to ACP preferences. As already stated, this is part of the
reason why ACP countries prefer to make use of ACP preferences rather than
the GSP schemes. This raises the issue of how to deﬁne the unilateral preference
dummies. To deal with this issue, we try another type of speciﬁcation for the
preference dummies: we take into consideration only the most used/favorable
regime. Therefore, if a product for a country is covered by diﬀerent regimes we
consider preferential access only under the most favorable regime. Following the
ﬁndings of Candau, Jean (2006),when a product is covered both by the Lomè
and by the set of GSP schemes, only the ACP dummy will take the value of
17one.11
Additionally, following Subramanian and Wei (2003) we assume that the
FTA is used rather than the GSP scheme. Results are reported in table four.
Latent var./ Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
Raw coeff. exp. value be cens. uncens.
gsp  0.733***  0.052***  0.112***  0.008***
gsp_ldc -0.087 -0.006 -0.013 -0.0009
drug_regime  0.758***  0.056***  0.116***  0.008***
ACP -0.902*** -0.062*** -0.136*** -0.009***
Log GDPexp  0.052  0.003  0.007  0.005
Fta  0.481***  0.034***  0.007***  0.005***
WTO -0.07 -0.004 -0.01 -0.0007
Table 4  Preferences as exclusive
Tobit estimates
Marg. Effects
pseudo R_squared: 0.1448                                 
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * **significant at 1%
Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
Number of observations 6515756
We ﬁrst note that the signs for GSP, the regime to combat drug production
and ACP preferences remains unchanged with respect to the previous spec-
iﬁcation. Thus GSP preferences and the regime to combat drug production
extort a positive eﬀect on the extensive margin of trade. On the contrary, ACP
preferences produce an anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀect. Diﬀerently from the ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcation, GSP LDC preferences are not signiﬁcant. The negative result of GSP
for LDC in the regression that considers all programs available to a country
seems to be driven by ACP LDC suggesting that least developing countries that
enjoy ACP preferences, tend to use the ACP program rather than the GSP for
LDC. Extension in the coverage of the products under GSP for LDC neither
impacts on the extensive nor on the intensive margin of trade. According to the
predictions of the Melitz model, this result can be explained by the presence of
no tariﬀ barriers and the high costs associate with the request for preferential
access that prevent LDCs to make use of preferences. Brenton (2003) has shown
that the EBA intiative is underutilized and he has advanced the hyphotesis that
underutilization could be due to strict ROO, high administrative costs and non
tariﬀ barriers. Our ﬁndings seem to conﬁrm this hypothesis. Importantly, the
fact that the previous result was driven by ACP LDC could suggest that ACP
preferences have a stronger anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀect on the ACP LDC. Since
11For example an exporter from Angola in 1999 could have chosen among the GSP for
the least developing countries and the access granted under Lome. Therefore, in the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation, the GSP for least developing countries and the Lome dummies for Angola will
take the value of one when the tariﬀ-line under each of these programs is covered by the
respective regime in a particular year.
18LDC are characterized by a stronger scarcity of resources, preferences could
have lead those countries to be locked into existing capacities more heavily.
In table ﬁve we report the results that follow from a probit estimations.
These represent a robustness check for the eﬀect of unilateral trade preferences
on the extensive margin of trade. The estimated marginal eﬀects conﬁrm the
previous results for both speciﬁcations of the dummy variables. When we thus
look at all potentially tradable products, ACP preferences produce an anti-
diversiﬁcation eﬀect while the GSP and the regime to combat drug production
impact positively on the extensive margin of trade.
Raw Marg. Raw Marg.
coeff. effects coeff. effects
gsp  0.073***  0.009***  0.093***  0.012***
gsp_ldc -0.085*** -0.010*** -0.005 -0.0006
drug_regime  0.076***  0.010***  0.089***  0.011***
ACP -0.035*** -0.004*** -0.027*** -0.003***
Log GDPexp -0.002 -0.0002 -0.003 -0.0004
Fta -0.003 -0.0003  0.066***  0.008***
WTO -0.003 -0.00003 -0.006 -0.0007




Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
Number of observations 6515756
Probit estimate
Pseudo R2 = 0.2809 Pseudo R2 =0.2802
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * **significant at 1%
Concerning the other results from both tobit and probit estimations, the
FTA dummy is not signiﬁcant when the dummies reﬂect preferential schemes
as non-exclusive while it becomes signiﬁcant with a positive sign when we deal
with exclusive dummies. This could be due to the fact that the entry into force
of the FTA did not change the trade pattern with respect to the situation in
which the FTA members had only the GSP. It is also worth to note that the
impact of the FTA may have taken place in the past rather than after the oﬃcial
conclusion of the agreement. Regarding the other variables, neither the GDP of
the exporting country nor the WTO dummy are signiﬁcant. Indeed, the GDP of
the exporting countries turns out to be a poor proxy for the number of varieties.
A better measure would be the production at the six digit level but data is not
available. The total GDP of the country could be considered a valid proxy if it
has a positive correlation with production data at the six digit level. Therefore,
we can either conclude that this correlation is captured by the sector dummies
or simply that the country dummies are taking away the eﬀect of the GDP
variable. Concerning the WTO dummy , we are not surprised by the results.
The WTO eﬀect can be understood as the potential beneﬁts derived by general
19tariﬀ cuts rather than a membership dummy and members of the WTO tend
to apply the MFN regime also to non-member countries.
Looking at all product lines gives an overview of a general eﬀect and in doing
so results suggest that ACP preferences have lead to an anti- diversiﬁcation eﬀect
while positive eﬀects are present for the GSP subschemes except in the case of
the GSP for LDC. These results take into account the full set of products which
can potentially be traded. This does not preclude that export diversiﬁcation
can occur along the value chain of a particular sector. For instance, preferences
could lead to focus in a particular sector and most likely in the sectors for which
having preferences still makes a diﬀerence. Following the studies on utilization
rates, we see that indeed utilization of preferences is very high in the case
of agricultural products and to a certain extent in the textile/clothing sector.
It seem thus logical to conclude that in these sectors having unilateral trade
preferences still makes a diﬀerence.
We thus provide estimates looking at the agricultural and at textile/clothing
products. In doing so we want to see whether anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀects occur
due to the concentration along the value chain of particular sectors. We do so
by looking at previous studies on the utilization rates and since we are trying
to stay as close as possible to the evidence on the utilization rates we keep the
deﬁnition of the dummies considering the best regime available.
Results for the agricultural products are reported in the following table:
Tobit estimates Latent Uncond. Cond. on Probab.
Marg. Effects var. exp. value be cens. uncens.
gsp  2.164***  0.260***  0.389***  0.063***
gsp_ldc -0.057 -0.006 -0.01 -0.001
drug_regime  2.493***  0.299***  0.448***  0.073***
ACP  2.503***  0.301***  0.450***  0.073***
Log GDPexp -0.270*** -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.007***
Fta  0.977***  0.117***  0.175***  0.028***
WTO -0.08 -0.009 -0.014 -0.002
Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
Table 6         Agriculture sector (chapter 1-24), Preference as exclusive
 pseudo R_squared: 0.1161                         
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * **significant at 1%
Number of observations 903226
With the single exception of GSP for LDC, which remains not signiﬁcant,
having unilateral trade preferences increases the probability that trade ﬂows are
positive. By the same token it increases the amount of trade when the trade ﬂow
is already positive and thus, unilateral preference schemes further encourage the
exports to the European Union.
20Concerning the magnitude of the marginal eﬀects, the ACP preferences and
the regime to combat drug production have the highest impact. ACP prefer-
ences’ impact on the conditional expected value of trade is around 45% and the
eﬀect on the probability that a good is traded is 7%. The marginal eﬀects in
the case of the regime to combat drug production are respectively around 44%
and 7%.
Tobit estimates Latent Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
Marg. Effects var. exp. value be censored uncens.
gsp  1.266***  0.181***  0.242***  0.023***
gsp_ldc  0.258  0.037  0.049  0.004
drug_regime  1.732***  0.247***  0.331***  0.032***
ACP  0.392  0.056  0.075  0.007
Log GDPexp -0.751*** -0.107*** -0.143*** -0.013***
Fta  0.714**  0.102**  0.136**  0.013**
WTO  0.042  0.006  0.008  0.009
Table 7 Textile/ Clothing sector (chapter 50-63), Preference as exclusive.
pseudo R_squared:0.1725               
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * **significant at 1%
 Number of observations 1047655
Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
Table seven presents the results for the textile sector. In this case, only GSP
and the regime to combat drug production have a positive impact, ACP and
G S Pf o rL D Cc o e ﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. The positive impact
of the regime to combat drug on the intensive margin of trade is around 34%
while on the extensive margin of trade the result is 3%. The fact that marginal
eﬀects of the GSP for LDC are still not signiﬁcant remain supportive of the idea
that stricter rules of origin have prevented exporters of LDCs not part of the
ACP group from taking full advantage of preferential access.
Regarding the marginal eﬀect of the exporter GDP, it seems that GDP is
behaving as a development indicator rather than a proxy for the number of
varieties. It is quite plausible that the country dummies are instead capturing
this eﬀect due to the short time dimension of our panel. As a matter of fact
when the country dummies are omitted, the marginal eﬀect of the exporter’s
GDP becomes positive. However, we prefer not to omit the country dummies
in order to avoid biased estimates for the other variables.12
In the following table we present the raw coeﬃcients and the marginal ef-
fects of the probit estimates when the dummies are coded as exclusive. The
magnitude and size of the marginal eﬀects do not diﬀer from the result of the
12For a similar conclusion see also Medvedev (2006). Indeed, it is rather diﬃcult to interpret
the eﬀect of the GDP on disaggregated trade data as a better proxy would be the use of sector
production data.
21tobit regression and tend to conﬁrm previous results. The only changes are in
the statistical signiﬁcance of the ACP dummy for the textile sector. However,
note that the marginal eﬀects are extremely low in magnitude in both the tobit
and the probit regression. Thus although these dummies change in statistical
terms, they do not change in terms of economic signiﬁcance.
Probit estimates
Marg. Raw Marg. Raw Marg.
Effects coeff. eff. coeff. eff.
gsp  0.362***  0.060***  0.158***  0.021***
gsp_ldc  0.011  0.001  0.029  0.003
drug_regime  0.386***  0.069***  0.180***  0.026***
ACP  0.396***  0.060***  0.088***  0.011***
Log GDPexp -0.046*** -0.006*** -0.077*** -0.010***
Fta  0.163***  0.025***  0.118***  0.016***
WTO -0.016 -0.002  0.006  0.0007
pseudo R_squared 
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * **significant at 1%
Constant, country, time and sector dummies not reported.
Table 8                                                                Preferences as exclusive
Agriculture Text./Clothing
0.2039 0.3474
5C o n c l u s i o n
Unilateral trade preferences constitute a subject for debate not only in terms of
eﬀective utilization but also in terms of possible negative eﬀects on the devel-
oping countries‘ eﬀort in the diversiﬁcation process.
Using a tobit and a probit analysis we have shown that the impact of uni-
lateral trade preferences on both the intensive and extensive margin of trade
is strictly linked to the type of program implemented and to the sector being
analysed.
Looking at the diﬀerent schemes, it is interesting to note that, while the
regime to combat drug production and the GSP had a positive eﬀect on both
the intensive and extensive margin of trade, ACP preferences seem to have lead
to an anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀect when we consider all possible tradable products.
When we consider only the best regime available to a country, the conclusion
does not diﬀer. The only exception is the GSP for LDCs, which does not seem to
have an impact on the export pattern of LDCs that enjoy only GSP preferences.
This would conﬁrm the idea that even if preferences allow duty free entrance,
stricter ROO, high administrative requirements and non tariﬀ barriers preclude
non ACP LDCs from asking preferences.
22We have shown that unilateral trade preferences have increased the range of
the exported products particularly in the agricultural sector also for ACP coun-
tries. This could suggest that ACP preferences have lead to the concentration
of exports in the agricultural sector, where ACP preferences have the highest
impact.
Looking at the results and at the diﬀerent features of the various schemes,
a preliminary conclusion supports the idea that unilateral trade preferences
seem to have lead to an anti-diversiﬁcation eﬀect in the case when preferences
where granted under permanent and stable schemes, such as the ACP-Lomè
framework.
As the process of liberalization continues, specialization pattern could have
problematic repercussions in those countries that have followed a specialization
pattern due only to more beneﬁcial market access than the MFN regime. Al-
though, our empirical strategy does not deal directly with the issue of margin
erosion, there are some reﬂections of a negative impact of margin erosion on
ACP countries. Eﬀectively, the period under study has been subject to the
liberalization process that followed the Uruguay Round commitments of the
European Union. The negative impact of ACP preferences on the volume of
trade seems thus to suggest that negative eﬀects due to preference erosion are
already in place.
Additionally, the concentration of resources in particular sectors seems to
suggest that preferences, if stable, could lead to investment along the value chain
of sectors in which preferences are more valuable. It remains thus a question to
identify in which part of the value chain, ACP preferences have a higher impact.
We conclude that unilateral trade preference could have helped developing
countries in exporting products in sector where trade liberalization is rather
diﬃcult, as represented by the ﬁndings of the estimates for the agricultural
sector. However, we do not know how much unilateral trade preferences can
indeed constitute a valid substitute for a pure MNF regime.
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26Appendix B: list of countries
Algeria Ghana Panama
Angola Grenada Papua New Guinea
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Paraguay
Arab Emirates Guinea  Peru 
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Phiiippines
Bahamas Guyana Qatar
Bahrain Haiti Rwanda 
Bangladesh Honduras Sao Tomé and Principe
Barbados India Saudi Arabia
Belize Indonesia Senegal
Benin  Iran Seychelles and dependencies
Bhutan Ivory  Coast Sierra  Leone 
Bolivia Jamaica Singapore
Brazil Jordan Solomon Islands
Brunei Darussalam Kenya South Africa
Burkina Faso  Kiribati  South Korea
Burundi Kuwait Sri  Lanka
Cambodia Laos  St Christopher and Nevis
Cameroon Lebanon St Lucia




Colombia Malaysia Tanzania 
Comores Maldives Thailand
Congo Mali Togo 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) Marshall Islands Tonga 




Dominican Republic Morocco Vanuatu
Ecuador Mozambique  Venezuela
Egypt Myanmar Vietnam
Ei Salvador Nepal  Western Samoa 
Equatorial Guinea  Nicaragua Yemen 
Ethiopa Niger Zambia
Fiji Nigeria Zimbabwe
Gabon Oman
Gambia Pakistan
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